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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED, 
through its administratrix 
MARY KAZAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-v-
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
R^PLY BRIEF 
C^se No. 890426 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is not about the legality of the defendant 
irrigation company's enlargement of irrigated acreage, or whether 
it obtained the appropriate change applications for storing water 
and changing locations where its water is used, or whether 
plaintiff Steed Estate is a lower user on ^ he Escalante River, or 
whether the Steed Estatef s rights on Alvey Wash were acquired by 
adverse use. Given that the trial court's judgment was based on 
its legal conclusion that the irrigation company was not liable 
for any loss suffered by the Steed Estate and that it did not 
reach the question as to the amount of the Steed Estate's loss, 
the issue on appeal does not involve issues that the irrigation 
company talks about. This case presents an overriding legal issue 
and is about technology and the rights of water users in the same 
river basin when the implementation of technology by one user 
adversely affects another. 
In support of its position, the irrigation company advocates 
the mechanical application of broadly stated rules of law from old 
cases that are factually and legally distinguishable from this 
case. The irrigation company's opposing brief is marked by 
dogmatic reliance upon the language of inapposite cases and a 
general disregard of the rationale of modern cases and policies-
that must be considered in applying old rules to new cases. 
Nowhere does the irrigation company offer any policy justification 
for the rule it would have apply to this case. The irrigation 
company wants all of the rights of a water user without accepting 
any of the responsibilities that go with those rights. 
I 
A Lower User on the Same River System Is 
Entitled to Protection Whether He Diverts 
From the Same Stream or a Contributing Stream 
A, The rationale in East Bench applies as well to users on 
different streams as it does to users on the same stream. 
The irrigation company attempts to distinguish East Bench 
Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 
449 (1954), from this case, arguing that in East Bench the lower 
user was diverting from the same stream as the upper user, where, 
as in this case, the Steed Estate is diverting from a different 
stream (Alvey Wash) than the irrigation company (Escalante River). 
The irrigation company argues that this distinction is legally 
significant because the court in East Bench distinguished the old 
waste water cases in part on the basis that they did not involve 
upper and lower users on the same stream. The distinguishing 
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language relied on by the irrigation company in its opposing brief 
goes well beyond the holding in East Bench, It is dicta, and as 
such it is not binding on this Court. That it is merely dicta is 
important, because the court there was not speaking on the basis 
of facts such as are before this Court anc^  the general dicta was 
not directed to a specific set of controlling facts. Nor is the 
dicta persuasive. Neither the court in East Bench nor the 
irrigation company offer any hydrological reason or policy 
justification for drawing such a distinction. 
The language in East Bench quoted by the irrigation company 
can best be explained as an effort by the court to, quite 
understandably, limit its holding to the facts at hand. After 
all, by its holding, the court in East Bench was rejecting a broad 
rule previously stated many times in earlier cases. A case-by-
case approach is in harmony with the apprqach taken by the court 
in Crocket v. Jones, 277 P. 550 (Idaho 1929), cited approvingly by 
the court in East Bench in support of its hblding. In Crocket, it 
is wisely noted that "The right to change the place of diversion 
and use of water depends upon and must be controlled by the facts 
of each particular case, and no inflexible rule applicable to all 
situations can be laid down." Id. at 552. 
It is the rationale of East Bench and ijiot its dicta that must 
define the scope of the rule announced. The decision in East 
Bench is based primarily on the court's recognition of two basic 
hydrological facts: (1) that much of the irrigation water used in 
a river basin finds its way back into the "river system" and is 
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used "over and over" for irrigation, and (2) that changes in place 
or manner of use by one user on a river system can have 
substantial effects on the water available for diversion by other 
users. 271 P.2d at 452, 454. These hydrological facts apply 
equally to upper and lower users on the same river system, whether 
the upper and lower users divert from the same stream or different 
streams in the river system. Likewise, the court's conclusions 
that the lower users in East Bench ought to be able to rely on 
existing stream conditions and that upper users ought not to be 
able to increase the amount of water consumed by a change in 
manner of use to the injury of lower users apply equally to all 
streams in a river system. Given the rationale of the East Bench 
case, there is no basis for drawing a legal distinction between 
the rights of upper and lower users on the same stream and upper 
and lower users on different streams in the same river system. 
The lack of any principled reason for distinguishing between these 
situations is shown by the following example. 
Imagine a farm located at the place where Alvey Wash joins 
the Escalante River. Assume that the farm is irrigated by water 
from Alvey Wash in the same amounts as have been diverted by the 
Steed Estate from Alvey Wash. Assume the water for this 
hypothetical farm is diverted from Alvey Wash at a point of 
diversion located five feet above where Alvey Wash joins the 
Escalante River. Now imagine the same farm with the same quantity 
of diversions; but this time the water formerly diverted from 
Alvey Wash is diverted after it flows into the Escalante River 
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from a point of diversion on the Escalante River five feet below 
where Alvey Wash joins the Escalante B\±VBTO The irrigation 
company would draw a legal distinction between the water rights of 
the farm owner in these two hypothetical Situations based on the 
location of the point of diversion. The irrigation company would 
say that under East Bench the diversions fjrom the Escalante River 
would be entitled to protection against lo$ses resulting from the 
irrigation company's change in the manned and place of use but 
that the diversions directly from Alvey Wash would not. Why 
should ten feet make a difference in the Legal rule applicable? 
Ten feet does not change either the hydrological facts or water 
policy. Thus, the protection against changes in manner and place 
of use granted in East Bench must be extended to all users on the 
same river system, and in this case to the Steed Estate. 
In East Bench, the court moved away from old cases that 
relied on labels like "waste water" to det0rmine water rights and 
moved to determining rights based on hydrological facts and .water 
policy. There should be and can be no goin^ back to the old ways. 
The rationale adopted by the court in East fiench is so contrary to 
the wooden approach used in earlier cases "qhat those cases are no 
longer authoritative. As the court ir Mannix & Wilson v. 
Thresher, 95 Mont. 267, 26 P.2d 373 (1933 held, a lower user's 
right to return flows transported from on< stream to another in 
the same river system as a result of an uppetr user's appropriation 
is entitled to protection against changes in the upper user's 
manner of use. The other cases and authorities relied upon by the 
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irrigation company are factually inapposite, having been 
superseded by the subsequent holdings in East Bench, Stubbs v. 
Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), and the other 
later cases cited in appellant's opening brief. 
B. The authorities relied upon by the irrigation company have 
been superseded and are factually distinguishable. 
In quoting from Hutchins' 1942 publication, Selected Problems 
in the Law of Water Rights in the West (page 16 of the irrigation 
company's brief), the irrigation company relies on old law. In 
his multi-volume treatise published between 1971 and 1977, 
Hut chins, in summarizing Utah law, acknowledges that the early 
Utah cases, relied upon here by the irrigation company, indicate 
that as between two adjoining tracts of land there is no 
obligation of the upper tract to continue to supply the lower 
tract. The law is different as to water that is permitted to 
return to a natural course. Acknowledging the existence of the 
old cases, relied on by the irrigation company, Hutchins comments 
in his later work: 
However, any part of the water used on the original 
appropriator?s land that seeps therefrom back into the 
main channel loses its identity and becomes a part of 
the natural flow therein. The same loss of identity 
occurs when water used for irrigation becomes commingled 
with the waters of the ground water table. 
2 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States 
578 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Hutchins then summarizes Utah law: 
Once waste and seepage waters pass from the control of 
the original appropriator, return to the natural channel 
and become a part of the supply for downstream users, 
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the landowner cannot, by an application for change, 
change his point of diversion,, place or manner of use if 
it interferes with the rights of a downstream user. An 
appropriator is entitled to rely on stream conditions 
remaining substantially as they were when he made his 
appropriation. 
Id. at 579 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
The treatise cited by the irrigation company as Weil on Water 
Rights (more properly Water Rights in the Western States) and 
relied upon by the irrigation company at page 17 of its brief is 
a 1911 treatise that was written prior to substantial and 
controlling later developments in the law. Even so, the 
quotations from Weil are factually misapplied because the author's 
comments are directed primarily to "waste water in a ditch or 
soaking from one land to another." Hetie we deal with water 
returned to a natural water course which is part of the same 
natural river system. More importantly, the law in Utah is 
settled that water that has been permitted to return to a natural 
course, even so-called waste water, is subject to appropriation. 
McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570, 571 (1952), 
Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1962). Also, Weil 
acknowledges that "a subsequent appropriator has a vested right as 
against his senior to insist upon the continuance of the 
conditions that existed at the time he mad« his appropriation." 
1 S. Weil, Water Rights in the Western States 314 (3rd Ed. 1911). 
Because such heavy reliance is plaqed by the irrigation 
company on the older Utah cases and cases which are factually 
inapposite, it may be well to briefly canvap some of those cases. 
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McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952), is 
cited for the proposition that a subsequent appropriator cannot 
require a prior appropriator to continue to waste water and that 
the prior appropriator can recapture and beneficially use waste 
water if he does so before it gets beyond his property and 
control. Dicta from McNaughton to that effect is quoted on page 
19 of the irrigation company's brief. Of course, East Bench, by 
holding otherwise on these issues, distinguishes the dicta quoted. 
More importantly, the actual holding in McNaughton supports the 
Steed Estate's position. 
In McNaughton, the trial court held that the defendants had 
no right to appropriate the subject waters from the flows in the 
gulch which were comprised of (1) natural flows, (2) surplus and 
waste water, (3) water draining into the gulch from irrigated 
lands adjacent to the gulch, (4) plaintiffs' irrigation water 
historically recaptured by plaintiffs, and (5) canal waters turned 
into the gulch to be used to irrigate plaintiffs' land. The trial 
court also held that plaintiffs' rights to these waters were not 
subject to any control or limited to any beneficial use. The 
issue on appeal was the defendants' contentions that the waters 
involved were public waters subject to appropriation and that the 
plaintiffs' right to use those waters was limited to the amount 
required to satisfy the reasonable and efficient beneficial use in 
accordance with plaintiffs' prior appropriation. McNaughton, 242 
P.2d at 571. The Court noted that: 
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If these are public waters defendants, as junior 
appropriators, are entitled to the use of all waters not 
required to satisfy all prior rights under reasonably 
efficient use* 
Id. at 571. 
In reversing the trial court, it was held tihat the defendants had 
appropriated the waters flowing down the qiilch and, to the extent 
plaintiffs had not used the water beneficially under their prior 
right of appropriation, defendants were entitled to the excess.1 
The Court said: 
The trial court correctly held that plaintiffs have the 
prior right to use all of these waters, because as to 
the first three divisions they have first appropriated 
them to a beneficial use before 1903 when no application 
to appropriate was necessary, but the court erred in 
holding that the plaintiffs1 rights to the use of these 
waters are not subject to reasonable regulation and 
control in the interest of saving walfer. It is clear 
that all of these waters are subject to appropriation 
and the only right that can be acquired to their use is 
a reasonably efficient beneficial use, and defendants as 
subsequent appropriators are entitled to the use of all 
of such waters not necessary to satisfy such 
requirements of plaintiffs. 
Id. at 575. 
While McNaughton holds that the subsequent appropriator is subject 
to the appropriation of prior appropriators to the extent water 
has been beneficially used in accordance with those appropriatorsT 
prior rights, it does not hold that the prior appropriator may 
expand his beneficial use beyond his original use to the detriment 
xIt was held that those waters vjhich plaintiffs had 
historically captured and which plaintiffs l>ad put in the gulch to 
irrigate their own land could not be appropriated since they never 
had left plaintiffs* possession. These waters could not have 
flowed to defendants at the time of their appropriation. 
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of subsequent appropriators. Indeed, the import of the case is 
directly to the contrary. 
The defendants in East Bench, like the irrigation company 
here, also relied upon Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238 P. 2d 418 
(1951), as support for their claim that they had the right to 
change the manner of their use and thereafter fully consume all 
the water which they diverted onto their lands by using it over 
and over again so long as they made use of it before it got off 
their land and out of their control. East Bench rejected this 
reading of the Lasson case, distinguishing Lasson on several 
alternative grounds, including that Lasson "did not involve a 
change of place of diversion or place or manner of use." East 
Bench, 271 P.2d at 456. 
While acknowledging the earlier "waste water" cases, Stubbs 
v. Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), relied upon by 
the irrigation company, confirms that we do not here deal with 
"waste water" concepts and mandates the reversal of the decision 
here appealed and requires the granting of the very relief the 
Steeds here seek. Although cited by the irrigation company, 
Stubbs is directly contrary to the position advocated by the 
irrigation company. In Stubbs, plaintiffs had for many years 
collected water in drains on their property and used the water to 
irrigate their lands. The water plaintiffs collected in their 
drains resulted both from the flow of irrigation water from 
defendants adjacent ground and from water in the underlying water 
table. Defendant later installed a closed drainage system to 
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lower the water table on his land and to collect the drainage 
waters so that they could be pumped and used for irrigation in a 
sprinkler irrigation system. As a result of defendant's 
installation of a closed drainage system, the flow from 
defendant's ground stopped, the underground water table was 
drained, and plaintiffs' drains dried up, Plaintiffs sued for 
damages and an injunction preventing defendant from interfering 
with their water rights. On appeal, the issue was "whether the 
plaintiffs have the right to the use of w^ter to which they had 
established prior rights . . . or whether the defendant in putting 
in his drainage system . . . has the right to use the water 
developed therefrom." Id. at 463. The court first affirmed that 
"when rights to . . . use have been established in accordance with 
law, they must be safeguarded." Id. In response to defendant's 
contention that the water involved was waste water in which 
plaintiffs' could acquire no rights, the Court said: 
The answer to the contention is that the waters produced 
in these [plaintiffs'] drains are noit waste waters as 
referred to in the usual sense . . . .| [T]hey resulted 
both from the irrigation of the defendant's higher 
ground and from the underlying watet table. We are 
quite in harmony with the idea that w^ter rights could 
not be acquired in waste water so that defendant would 
be obligated to continue to irrigate his higher ground 
to provide water to be collected in the plaintiffs' 
drains. But after irrigation water is used and becomes 
commingled with waters in the natural water table, it 
has lost its identity as irrigation water and is no 
longer owned by defendant as such. Such waters in the 
natural water table are and always have been subject to 
appropriation. . . . [T]o whatever extent plaintiff 
[sic] had lawfully established prior rights to the use 
of water from these sources, their ridhts are entitled 
to protection and defendant may not encroach thereon and 
usurp their water . . . . 
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:id. at 463-464. 
The case was remanded for determination of the amount of water 
lost by plaintiffs and for entry of a decree precluding defendant 
from diminishing the flow to plaintiffs. 
In this case, the Steed Estate's water rights are established 
by a duly issued certificate of appropriation and by court decree. 
At the time that appropriation was acquired, Alvey Wash users 
depended upon flow from springs and seepage, which is now 
impaired. Also at the time the appropriation was made, the 
irrigation company's return flow augmented the flow of Alvey Wash. 
None of the pre-East Bench cases involve such a situation. The 
general rule in East Bench, Stubbs, and Piute Reservoir & 
Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 12 
Utah 2d 168, 364 P.2d 113 (1961) applies. These cases, being the 
most recent, are controlling. 
II 
Losses to the Steeds Must Be Made Up 
Regardless of the Sources Used to Make Up the Loss 
The irrigation company complains that if it is required to 
make up the losses that have resulted to the Steed Estate from the 
irrigation company's change to a sprinkler irrigation system, it 
will be required to artificially divert water from the Escalante 
River to the Steed Estate on Alvey Wash.2 The irrigation company 
2It is significant in this regard that plaintiff's 60 acres 
irrigated with Alvey Wash water are included in the 2712.28 acres 
defendant claims it is entitled to irrigate with Escalante River 
water. Exhibit 10; Exhibit 110. 
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claims that because of this, it is somehow relieved of its 
responsibility for the consequence of its voluntary conduct. But 
the principle established in East Bench does not permit the 
irrigation company to avoid so easily the Responsibility for the 
adverse consequence of its change in manned of use and resulting 
increase in its consumption of water. Moreover, as noted below, 
making up this loss does not require the diversion of any more 
water from the Escalante but merely requites that a very small 
portion of the water saved by the new technology be allocated to 
protection of existing Alvey Wash rights. 
When the irrigation company began irrigating from the 
Escalante River in 1875, it artificially affected the flow of 
water in the Escalante River basin, shifting water from the 
Escalante River to Alvey Wash, a tributary -^o the Escalante River 
and part of the same river system. As a necessary consequence of 
the best methods of irrigation then available (flood irrigation), 
the flow in Alvey Wash was increased. Consistent with the water 
policy of this State, which dictates the efficient use of water, 
the Steed Estate's predecessors-in-interest and other land owners 
on Alvey Wash appropriated the augmented flpws in Alvey Wash for 
irrigation purposes. This placed to beneficial use the seepage 
and return flows to the river system naturally resulting from the 
irrigation company's irrigation methods. 
In exchange for the right the law ga^e to the irrigation 
company to divert water from the Escalante River, with the 
resulting changes in the patterns and paths jsf the return of that 
13 
water to the Escalante River, the law imposed certain obligations 
consistent with promoting the beneficial use of water. Having 
undertaken to use the water diverted in a certain manner, the 
irrigation company assumed liability for any injuries to lower 
users in the same river basin as a result of later changes in 
manner of use, particularly any changes that resulted in increases 
in the consumption of water. In accordance with the 
responsibility imposed, the irrigation company must make up the 
loss that has resulted from its change in manner of use regardless 
of whether it must divert water from the Escalante River to do so. 
Otherwise, the equilibrium the law seeks to maintain between upper 
and lower users in the same river system--in this case one that 
has existed for 75 to 100 years—will be significantly disrupted. 
The Steed Estate does not seek to compel the irrigation 
company to continue to divert water from the Escalante River or to 
compel the irrigation company to use any particular method of 
irrigation. All the Steed Estate seeks is to have the irrigation 
company accept the responsibility for the losses the Steed Estate 
has suffered as a result of the irrigation company's voluntary 
change in the manner the water is used. The irrigation company 
is, accordingly, free to implement any water-saving technology it 
desires to use and have the benefits of that technology to the 
extent the benefits to the irrigation company are not merely the 
result of the use of technology to shift the water used by the 
Steed Estate to the irrigation company. To the extent the 
technology does this, it is not water-saving technology but merely 
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water-shifting technology, which does not increase the beneficial 
use of water or encourage conservation„ 
III 
The Steed Estate's Rights, Whether by Appropriation or 
Adverse Use, Were Vested at the Time of First Appropriation 
and Were Confirmed in the Adjudication Proceedings 
The irrigation company argues tliat for purposes of 
determining whether it is required to maKe up losses resulting 
from its change in manner of use a distinction should be drawn 
between the Steed Estatef s water rights vfhich are based upon a 
certificate of appropriation and those basjed on adverse use. In 
response, it must first be noted that the Steed's water user 
claims were not obtained by exercise of an^ rights adverse to the 
irrigation company. Secondly, those rights are fully adjudicated 
and vested. Finally, and perhaps most important, there is no 
hydrological or policy justification foi the distinction the 
irrigation company wishes to elevate to le^al significance. 
The Steed's adjudicated water user claims were acquired as a 
matter of adversity only as to other user^ on Alvey Wash. They 
are not based on adversity as to the irrigation company. When 
that water was placed to beneficial use ov^r three-quarters of a 
century ago, there was no contention by ^he irrigation company 
that that use was adverse to it. There is no record of any 
protest that the water was not subject to 4pPr°Pria"tion or could 
not be placed to beneficial use. The matter of adversity arose 
only as to a matter of priority of right^ as between users on 
Alvey Wash. No one would seriously contend that the water should 
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have been left unused, to end up in the Colorado. Nor did the 
irrigation company raise any issue of adversity years later in the 
general adjudication proceeding, where the water was adjudicated 
to the Steeds. Pretrial Order dated July 27, 1977, Exhibit 77. 
That an issue was presented in that proceeding as to priority 
between the users on Alvey Wash is of no consequence to the 
irrigation company here. 
The Steed Estate's water rights based on adverse use were 
vested in 1915 and 1917, according to the Approved Proposed 
Determination. Exhibit 10, page 207, Water User Claim Nos. 1272 
and 1440. By the Pretrial Order in this case, the irrigation 
company stipulated that plaintiff's water rights were as set forth 
in the Approved Proposed Determination. (R. 93, II.F., page 5.) 
The Approved Proposed Determination recognizes and adjudicates the 
validity of the Steed Estate's rights acquired by adverse use, the 
same as it does the Steed Estate's rights acquired by certificate 
of appropriation. 
How the Steed Estate's rights were acquired is not relevant 
to the reconciliation of the competing interests involved here. 
The significant thing for purposes of resolving the issue here is 
that the return flows were appropriated and that the appropriation 
is recognized by a court of law as having been lawfully made. 
Once recognized as having been lawfully made, the Steed Estate's 
rights to appropriate from Alvey Wash became vested for all 
purposes. This is particularly so under the circumstances of this 
case, since the validity of the Steed Estate's rights to divert 
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from Alvey Wash were judicially determined in a statutory 
adjudication proceeding to which the irrigation company, as a 
water user in the Escaiante Basin, was a Jparty* The irrigation 
company's attempt to make something of the existence of a protest 
by other persons left unanswered in that proceeding now twelve 
Years over is but a misplaced afterthought^.3 
Moreover, this argument of the irrig^ -cion company falls of 
its own weight, being based on an erroneous assumption that the 
water is "waste water." This water was not "waste water" and was 
subject to appropriation• East Bench, Stupbs, supra. 
Finally, the irrigation company attaches mo^e significance to 
the basis of the Steed Estatefs right than do the cases cited by 
the irrigation company* Whether the lower User's right was based 
on an appropriation or adverse use was q>f no significance in 
either Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 p. 867 (1912), or East 
Bench. The language in Garns states expressly that the result 
would be the same whether the lower user's right was based on 
"appropriation, prescription [adverse use], or astoppel." Id., at 
872. The court in Garns was not prepared to admit that a lower 
user had any rights in waste or retiirn water under any 
3At the time the order approving the Proposed Determination 
was entered, some Alvey Wash users protested the Steed Estatefs 
claims based on adverse use. But in light of the parties' 
stipulation in the pretrial order in this case that the Steed 
Estate's rights are as set forth in the prjoposed determination, 
the protest raises no issue here. In Addition, because the 
protestors have not pressed their protest ^t any time during the 
last thirteen years, the protest has beer effectively, if not 
technically, waived. 
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circumstances. The court in East Bench has, however, upheld a 
lower user's rights to waste or return water based primarily on 
its recognition that changes by one user on a river system can 
have effect on the rights of other users. Though East Bench does 
not appear to involve any claim based on adverse use, in its 
articulation of the rule it was applying the court made no 
distinction between the basis of the lower usersf water right and 
their right to be protected from the adverse effects of changes by 
upper users. The court said: 
The upper users cannot by a change in place of diversion 
or by a change in place or nature of use consume more 
water than would have been consumed without the change 
and thereby deprive the lower users of their right to 
use such water without impairing the vested rights of 
such lower users. 
271 P.2d at 454. 
The irrigation company's argument that an adjudicated claim 
based on adverse use should be treated differently is nothing more 
than a variation of its argument that the rule in the old waste 
water cases, rather than the rule in East Bench and Stubbs, should 
control in this instance. The rationale and rule in the later 
cases applies equally to adjudicated water rights based on adverse 
use as to water rights based on appropriation. 
IV 
This Case Does Not Depend on the Requirement 
To File a Change Application 
The failure of the irrigation company to file a change 
application is relevant here only because it affects the 
allocation of the burden of proof. Because it was required to 
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file a change application, the burden of proving that the change 
affects the Steed Estate's rights (normally resting on the 
plaintiff) shifts to the irrigation company. Piute Reservoir & 
Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 12 
Utah 168, 364 P.2d 113, 116 (1961). The scope of the statutory 
provisions requiring change applications (§§ 73-3-3(3), (4), (5), 
73-3-6, 73-3-7, Utah Code Annotated) in no way limits the Court's 
ability and duty to protect one user from the adverse effects of 
change in use made by another. It would be inappropriate to 
construe a remedial statute obviously intended to regulate changes 
that might affect the rights of others as restricting in any way 
the scope of protection otherwise available. The intent of the 
legislature in adopting this statute was siirely to expand and not 
limit the protection available. 
The language in East Bench recognizees the court's duty to 
provide broad protection to lower user^. The court stated 
repeatedly that changes in "nature" and "|manner" and "place of 
use, " as well as changes in place of diversion, cannot be made 
without protecting the lower users from the effects of these 
expansive categories of changes. 271 P.2dj at 453. So, even if 
the irrigation company were not required to submit a change 
application, it would still be liable for the injury caused to 
others as a result of its change in manner and place of use. 
In addition, because of the remedial purposes of the change 
application procedure, the statute should b4 broadly construed to 
permit regulation of changes that potentially affect other users. 
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"Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil 
and advance the remedy." 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 
60.01. The procedure applies to changes in "point of diversion, 
place or purpose of use." § 73-3-3(3), Utah Code Annotated. The 
statute can readily be construed to include a change in use from 
the "purpose" of flood irrigation to the "purpose" of sprinkler 
irrigation. And, as noted above, this Court has used expansive 
language ("nature" and "manner" of use) in applying this statute. 
In an attempt to avoid the impact of this statute, the 
irrigation company cites a number of cases to support the 
proposition that the irrigation company's shareholders can change 
the place where they use irrigation company water without filing 
a change application. The cases cited all involve disputes 
between irrigation companies and shareholders that wished to 
change either their point of diversion or place of use. This fact 
is central to the rationale for the rule. In the cases cited, it 
is reasoned that since no one would be affected by the 
shareholder's change in use except other shareholders, the change 
is merely a matter of internal management of the irrigation 
company. Under those circumstances, it was felt that no change 
application should be required. See Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork 
Irr. Co.,97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939); Arnold v. C. & R. Ass'n, 
64 Utah 534, 231 P. 622, 623-624 (1924); Baird v. Upper Canal 
Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060, 1065 (1927) (the court 
noted that the shareholder can use, lease, or otherwise dispose of 
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the water only "so long as the rights of others are not interfered 
with"). 
The cases cited do not address and failed to foresee a 
situation like that presented here, where the change in manner of 
use has an adverse effect on a nonshareholper's rights. Had they 
foreseen such a situation, one can hardly suppose the court would 
have permitted the change in use that ^ould cause injury to 
another user without complying with the change application 
procedure specifically designed to protect affected users. The 
rationale for the rule in these cases will not permit the rule to 
be applied here, where the dispute .nvolves the effects 
shareholder changes in place of use on a lonshareholder's water 
right.4 
With respect to the irrigation company's assertion that the 
Court should defer to the State Engineer's knparent interpretation 
of the statutory provisions relating to change applications, it 
must be remembered that this Court is the ultimate interpreter of 
statutes. It would also be inappropriate bo rely on the content 
of the State Engineer's change application forms or procedures in 
a case of apparent first impression. Theire is no evidence that 
the State Engineer has considered a situation like this in either 
interpreting the change application statute or the preparation of 
forms or instructions. An oversight or failure to anticipate all 
4Plaintiff does own shares of stock in defendant (R. 440; 
T.87), but the water rights involved in this suit are not derived 
through stock ownership. 
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possible effects of certain types of changes in use by the State 
Engineer is not persuasive. But if the irrigation company 
advances this theory, it must accept the full ramifications of the 
theory, including the statement in Exhibit 29 made by the State 
Engineer's representative in Cedar City, who has been in charge of 
administering water matters in this district for several decades, 
that "It is known that when the New Escalante Irrigation Co. went 
to sprinkler system that it diminished the reflow into Alvey Wash 
and based on this premise it might be understood that the flow 
from Alvey Wash must now be further supplemented from irrigation 
company shares." Exhibit 29 was erroneously excluded by the trial 
court, but the irrigation company cannot in one breath say that 
statements of the State Engineer's office cannot be admitted at 
trial but afterwards claim that other statements by the State 
Engineer's office should be considered. 
V 
There Is Sufficient Water to Make Up Losses 
to Downstream Users and Still 
Expand Irrigation Company Use 
No one needs to lose in this case. The savings in water 
consumed by the use of the new technology enables the downstream 
users to be fully protected while still providing very substantial 
increase in water available to the irrigation company. It is not 
contended that the irrigation company's change to a sprinkler 
system has increased the amount of water available for diversion 
from the Escalante River, or that the irrigation company does not 
use all the water it is entitled to divert (and perhaps then 
22 
some), or that the irrigation company has or has ever had all of 
the water it can use in the late summer. But it is undisputed 
that the irrigation company's use of a pressurized sprinkler 
irrigation system has reduced the amount o^ water returning to the 
river system through Alvey Wash, thereby making more water 
available for effective application to cr^ps. As a result, the 
number of acres that can be irrigated with the irrigation 
company's water has increased. In short with the pressurized 
sprinkler irrigation system, more acres ca^ i now be irrigated with 
the same amount of water. Some of the w^ter now available for 
irrigation previously returned to the rivefr system through Alvey 
Wash, where it was diverted by the Steed Estate. 
The reason the irrigation company is ^ till short of water in 
the late summer since installation of the pressurized sprinkler 
irrigation system is because the water is being used to irrigate 
more acreage at one time than ever before. Between an additional 
600 to 900 acres are being irrigated now ovbr that which could be 
irrigated by flood irrigation based on the years for which 
evidence is available. (See page 19 of the Steed Estate's Opening 
Brief.) It is not surprising, then, that evjen after the sprinkler 
system was installed the irrigation compan^ is short of water in 
late summer. Only now it is short of water to irrigate over 2700 
acres instead of short of water to irrigate 2000 or fewer acres 
irrigated in the past. Fortunately, under the facts of this case, 
the irrigation company can replace the loss suffered by the Steed 
Estate and all other users on Alvey Wash anc still irrigate nearly 
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20% more acreage than it had been able to irrigate before it 
changed to a pressurized sprinkler irrigation system.5 (See the 
Steed Estate's opening brief, p. 28.) 
CONCLUSION 
Under the rationale of the East Bench case, there is no 
principled way to distinguish between the rights of lower users on 
the same stream and lower users on different streams in the same 
river basin. In both situations the lower user is entitled to be 
protected from losses suffered to it as a result of change in the 
upper user's manner of water use. The statements from the cases 
relied upon by the irrigation company in support of its position 
are inconsistent with the holding and rationale of later cases. 
The Steed Estate's water rights are vested and entitled to 
protection. If an irrigation company can be permitted to ignore 
these rights, "then water rights become tenuous indeed, if not 
quite meaningless." Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d at 463. The 
irrigation company should be required to make up the Steed 
Estate's losses. Even then, it will be able to irrigate more 
acreage than ever before. 
5At pages 13-14 of the irrigation company's brief, it states 
that the Steed Estate was irrigating between 15 and 30 acres with 
water obtained through the purchase of rental stock from the 
irrigation company. This is incorrect. Those figures are for the 
acreage being irrigated with the water available from Alvey Wash 
during the years mentioned. (R. 442; T.89.) The Steeds have 
watered about 75 acres with the water represented by their stock 
in the irrigation company. (R. 440; T.87.) 
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